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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATENE: IT OF TI-lE NA TlJRE OF TI-lE CASE

Appellants were charged with burglary, in violation of Title
"•,
,·1

Charter 6, Section 202 ( 1 ) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
SF'"~nd-degree

felony, and theft, in violation of Title 76, Chapter

; , S1cct 1 on 404, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, a second-degree
f • } C1I !'j.
DISPOSITION IN TI-lE L,Ot,JER COURT

Appellants v1ere tried before a
1

·iHr•1•~s.

JW)!

and found guilty of both

in the Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable J. Dennis

I· r' <J, r 1 ck presidin0.
f1f\,.,·1:

y1~,,rc, \·1,:is

Ser 1tence

of an indetemunate tenn of frcm one

1mpt--ed ""both Appc·llants on March 21, 1983 and

hj>p• If ,-mt'"' s•·ek a11 r:>rd•T of this Court reversing the judgrrent

STAID·1ElIT OF nlE FACTS
Richard Tharpson a resident of Park City, Utah and the victim
of this crirre arrived back fran a business trip on January

~

1983 to

find that his house had been burglarized and various items of personal
property were discovered rmssing ( T. 13) .

Of those i terns discovered

missing there was a certain VCR uru t, various guns, and a pair of cowboy boots (T. 14-47).

On January 6, 1983 a person called the Park City Police Department, indicating that he had certain infonnation regarding a burglary
and theft occurring in Park City, Utah.

Later that same day officers

fran the Park City Police Department met with that person (hereinafter
referred to as confidential infonnant and ref erred to such throughout
the proceedings) (T. 58).

The confidential infonnant arranged a meeting

bebaeen Appellants and a Park City police officer operating undercover,
for January 7, 1983 (T. 65).

All of the details of that particular meet-

ing were arranged by the confidential infonnant (T. 82).
On January 10, 1983 Joseph L. Offert, a Park City police officer
sought and obtained a Search

Warrant for Appellant Chamber's residence.

In connection with obtairnng the Search \!!arrant officer Off ert signed an
Affidavit for a Search \•Jar rant.
Pursuant to the Search \!!arrant officers executed on the Search
\!Jarrant at the house of Appellant Chambers and seized as ev1dcnnc om·
pair of Tony Lama size 8~D lizard tip cov.~y boots and one lu•]ar . .':'
caliber pistol, serial nlll1tt:Rr 3CJ4'1G lbrov.n lb]tl1er hcdstc·r
Search Warrant ) .

I

lrctc1rr, •·f

Evidence wrnch the District Court denied and those two pieces of evidence
introduced at the Appellant's trial (State's Exhibit 11 and State's

,,.,~

Prior to trial Appellants filed a M::>tion to require the State
1D

disrlose the identity of a confidential informant which M::>tion was

demed,
Prior tor trial Appellant Chambers filed a Notice of Alibi and
alibi evidence was presented at trial (T. 150-155 and 175-179).
At the conclusion of the trial the State requested and the
Court gave an Instruction regarding the presumption flowing from possession of recently stolen property without a satisfactory explanation and
appli eel that both to the theft charge and the burglary charge (Instruction

llo. 25).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY NOT SUPPRESSING
EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT TO THE SEARCH WARRAIIT BECAUSE THE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS INSUFFICIENT AND
SEIZURE OF THE EVIDENCE CONSTITUTED A VIOLATION OF APP2LLANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
Appellants concede that if the Court applies the test established
•1, Illimos v. Gates,
l\_•urt
dd'JC

u. s.

, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983) in which the

established the "totality of the circumstances" test then the Affi-

t in Sup!->Ort of the Search Warrant was sufficient.
HO\,ever AppPllan+s' p__isit1on is that the appropriate test to

- --:-_._~,
",,.,,,

\-~-

u,". 11 •H, cv. ::; . Ct. 1 ',(J'J l l 'lb4) wherein the United States

C•Jurt •·stalrl1•J1F'Ci c-ihat has been called and referred to as the

- 3-

"two-prong" test.

The test was further m:xlified and affi m!Pd by the

Suprane Court in Spinelli v. Uruted States, 393 U.S. 410, Bq S.Ct. SR4
( 1969).

The "two-prong" test requires that the infonnant 's information

rru.st:
(a)

reveal the informant's basis of knowledge and

(b)

provide sufficient facts to establish either the in-

formant's veracity or the reliability of the informant's repcrt.
The Affidavit in Suppcrt of the Search Warrant indicates the
basis for the informant's knowledge as that of personal observation and
conversation with Appellants.

However the second prong of the Aguilar

test is not established upon the four corners of the Affidavit in that there
is nothing contained therein to establish either the informant's
or the reliability of the informant's repcrt.

veracity

Appellants do note however

that the independent police activity suppcrting the reliability of the
information given by the confidential informant was the purchase of the
vid~o

recorder by an undercover officer and an identification of that

video recorder by the victim.

Appellant's contend that this is not suf-

ficient corrobcration under the Aguilar test to sustain the search.
Appellants contend that the Aguilar-Spinelli "two-prong" test
should be applied in this case, because the Illinois v. Gates, supr·a
"totality of the cirCUIT'stances" test 111as prospective only.

Appellants'

pcsition is primarily taken from the Gates decision wht>rein at 10)
S.Ct. 2332 the Supreme Court said:
For~

1

all of these reH.s,-=ir i~ v1c cone l ud1 ·

t is wiser to abaridon

t

hc-Jt

ttie "t_~,Ju-prc>rF('

test establ 1 shc>fi by ~r dec1s1 on.s i r 1 A{JU1 J ,1r~
In 1t-::, p1rwt V-Jf' n~ciff1~
"totalitYOf tht c1rr·urL"t u1cec," rlndvsic.
thar irarl.1t1onil1y f-ic-1°~ fr_1nT''.i 11r11tr1!·lt cau:-,,_~

and Sp111e11J.

-1.-

determinations. (efll)hasis added)
POINT II

APPELLANTS WERE DENIED DUE PROCESS OF
UWI BY THE COURT'S FAILURE TO REQUIRE
THE STATE TO DISCLOSE THE IDENTITY OF
THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Forshee, 611 P.2d 1222 involving a charge of distribution of a controlled substance for value
held that since the infonnant was m:::>re then a mere informer of a crime
about to occur and actually took an active part in arranging meetings
ard

v11 tness

the illegal drug sale the defendant's request for disclosure

of the infonnant's identity was warranted.

The Court went on to hold

theit since the defendant knew the identity of the infonnant that the
second exception to the privilege of non-disclosure had been met by the

In the case at bar Appellants filed a Motion to require the
State to prcx:luce the identity of the confidential infonnant, Appellant
01amber filed a Notice of Alibi and the Affidavit in Support cf the Search
'•iinTant

contained inforrration regarding the knowledge of the confidential

1r,:urmant and his participation in the crime.
Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, (applicable at the time
nf the' trial) provides:
A witness has a privilege to refuse to
d1c,close the ldentity of a person who has
furnished lnformation purporting to disclose~] a v1olat1on of a provision of the
lcfr.'S Df this SL-ite or of the United States
t,, ,,

1Jr111

t

q

ir •·~1 'lit

f><l :<t (-1t 1,

<Jt

or
d1'1r·-J'·ri

l Vt'

C>f

the State of the

~Jc1'.'Cn1fT~-ntal

d1vis1on

the chJty of enforcing
t11 11 prn\'l'.->ton, and eV1dence thereof i s inoiCbJ',c,it,Jc, unl<ess the Judge finds that
(,J) the ld•'nt1ty of the person furnishing
1J.~tt'(·f,

h'1tt1

-5-

the information has already been other-wise disclosed or (b) disclosure of his
identity is essential tc assure a fair
determination of the issues.
The Supreme Court in Forshee, supra indicated at pagP 1223:
Whether the Court should require disclosure of an informer's identity, not
otherwise known tc the defendant, in a
particular case is a probl6Tl which properly requires a detennination by the
trial court based on a balancing of several factcrs, i.e., pctential hazards to
the safety of the parties involved, public
interest in protecting the flow of information from informants, and defendant's
right tc prepare his defense; based on
such factors, the trial court must determine how the interests of Justice will
best be served. (citations omitted)
Appellants by filing with the District Court a Notice of Alibi
and entering a plea of not guilty and Appellant Jacobsen's testirrony at
trial as well as the informant's participation in the sale of the VCR
as set forth in the Affidavit in Suppcrt of the Search Warrant substantiate
Appellants' contention that the informant in this case was rrore then a mere
informer but that he actually took an active part in arranging and meeting
and witnessed the illegal sale.

The aspect of the Forshee case which

V1 tiate any prejudice flowing to the Defendants in this case was as stated
by the Supreme Court at 611 P.2d 122°.:
Ho1~ever, it is defendant's very knovJledge
of the informer's identity that further
served to vitiate any pre Judice wluch may
have other,1ise res\lltc_-0 fn:rn U1P lovlPr
court's failure to requirP disclosure.

In this case thE" record

l'.: bu.r'f'

n

L]drd1nq

of the ident1 ty of u-,e confldPnti.il inform,11t.

ApfH_

1 Jarit

c,'

k!Fl'.'.'].-·rJ,11

POHIT III
TI-!E COURl ERRED BY INSTRUCTING THE JURY
TI!M AN UNSATISFACTORY EXPLANATION OF
POSSESSION COLlf'LlIJ WITI-! OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES
MAY BE SUFFICIENT TO CONNECT THE POSSESSORS
WITI-! TI-!E OFFENSE OF THEFT AND BURGLARY AND
JUSTIFY TI-!EIR CONVICTION OF THESE OFFENSES.
Utah Law as contained 76-6-402 Utah Annotated, 1953, as amended
rrnv1dcs:

TI1e follovnng presurrption shall be applicable to this part:
(1) Possession of property recently stolen,
when no satisfactory explanation of such possession is made, shall be deemed prima facie
evidence that the person in possession stole
the property.
r~11

•'l l Lll1t s contend that this provision of Utah law is unconstitutional on

1'=s face

since it penalizes a person for exercising his constitutional

rFJh1 tc, remain silent.
The Court instruction at Instruction No. 18 as follows:
A person cormuts theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property
of another with the purpose to deprive him
thereof.
Possession of property recently stolen, when
no satisfactory explanation of such possession
is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence
that the person in possession stole the property.
!'l'l" I !ant Chamh.'rs did not testify at the trial and under Utah and Federal
'1t•it1on,1l la"'' it viould be improper to comnent on Appellant Charrbers
l•n•' t•,

t.ox,t

1fy.

Tiw c1h<•Vt'

: l

I· 'I"· l''"["·t t·;.

J,

't F ·(

Instruct1on does exactly that.

r I 1(it

The· Ut,,[1

t I it_' i:=x-~rson in

By telling

possession of that pro-

Supreme Court in State v. \'lisviell,

629 P.2d 146 (1981) in relying upon Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976)
held that reference to post arrest silence is prejudicial.
The Court's Instruction No. 18 is a direct reference to Appell ant Charrbers post arrest silence.
POIN1 IV
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION THAT POSSESSIOrJ
OF PROPERTY RECENTLY STOLEN, WHEN NO SATISFACTORY EXPLANATION OF SUCH POSSESSION IS
MADE, SHALL BE DEEl''1ED PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE
THAT THE PERSOn rn POSSESSION STOLE THE PROPERTY IMPROPERLY SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF PROOF
TO THE IDEID''NTS AIID WAS INCQnSISTENT WITH
DEFENDANTS' RIGH'S TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT.
In Instruction No. 18 of the Court's instructions the fol lovnng
appears:
A person comnits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the property
of another with the purpose to deprive him
thereof.
Possession of property recently stolen, when
no satisfactory explanation of such possession
is made, shall be deemed prima facie evidence
that the person in possession stole the property.
The Utah Suprme Court in State v. Walton, 646 P.2d 689 (1982) ruled that
it was error to instruct the Jury that the la\'l presumes a person intends
the reasonable and orchnary consequences of his ovm acts.

In ruling on

that case the Court relied upon Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. ':>10, CJ9 S.Ct.
2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979), in holding that it was a violation of defendant's due process rights to give the above r·eferred to Instr-uct1on.

Sandstrom, supra and quoted extCTLSl'Jt'ly frnn1 s.in1btr-uc
First, a r·easonable JUry rnu11l V!f'~ l l1ri'/f'
int Prpreted the pr e9r.1pr-1 on d::- "r ·, 111, l us1 ve," that is, ncJt tf-><·~un 1 ·dll'/ dL, ,1 r 1r•

-tl-

dS f,;])1•.:c

surrption at all, but rather as in irrebuttable direction by the court to
find intent once convinced of the facts
triggering the prest.nption. Alternatively,
the Jury may have interpreted the instruction as a direction to find intent upon
proof of the defendant's voluntary actions
(and the1 r "ordinary" consequences) , unless
the defendant proved the contrary by sare
quantum of proof which may well have been
considerably greater than "sare" evidencethus effectively shifting the burden of
persuasion on the element of intent.
The Utah Supreme Court then went on to apply the Sandstran
ruling to the Walton facts by holding:
It is true that in the instant case, the jury
was told that it may employ the prest.rnption.
It was not canpelled to do so. That fact,
however, does not elirrunate the error. Since
it was given the option of employing the presumption, we have no way of being assured that
the defendant was not convicted on the basis
of that presumption. The presumption was not
permissive in the sense that the jury was told
that it could be considered along with other
evidence in resolving the issue of intent.
Rather, the jury was told that it could employ
the presumption. If it did, it may have fallen
victim to the mischief pointed out in Sandstrom
v. Montana, supra.
In the present case the Court's Instruction that possession of
i=''"f'erty recently stolen when no satisfactory explanation of such possession
is

rr~ide

shall be deemed prima facie evidence that the person in possession

st.Jlf' the property created in the case at bar a presumption regarding an
oe]e'f:n1t

of the Stiite's case.

1• 11 ants'

This presumption flies in the face of Ap-

"presurnpt ion of innocence" anrl irrproperly shifts the burden of

r ·u1;n v
nn:m

,,;,s

CC 1: JV! ,~Tl()[ I

rn:oUFFICIErH EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY
[[J

THTS CASE.

At'f>ell.u,+c; cunt,onri tlii1t because there was no direct evidence

offense, coupled with the unrebutted alibi eVldence preseritc°<CI at trtdl,
that there was insuff1c1ent evidence upon which a Jury could cnnv1d.
Appellants concede that this argument is ITDre forceful as it rPliltes to
Appellants' conviction for burglary than Appellants' conV1ct1on for theft
but even as

l

t relates to theft tllere was insuff1c1ent eVldence to JUSt1fy

conV1ct1on for the cri!T'€ charged.
CONCLUS.DN
For the foregoing reasons Appellants seek reversal of their

r

conV1ct1ons, or in the al ternat1 ve for a nevJ trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

ay

of/-~'-"--'---~-/-'

1 CJ84.
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